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2 
Abstract 
This report presents the microsimulation model developed for multidimensional population proje ctions. It 
contains a concise description of the model's specifications coupled with a detailed description of its labour 
force and employment modules. The report also presents scenarios of economic integration of immigrants from 
the third countries and a summary of the scenario assumptions.  Demographic modelling is based on analysis 
of the existing gaps in labour force participation and employment using Labour Force Survey data. We look at 
two dimensions of economic integration of immigrants – labour force participation and employment. At fixed 
demographic trends and labour force and employment of EU-born, we can evaluate the impact of improved, 
continued or worsened economic integration of immigrants in the EU and in individual member states. Our 
results illustrate that integration policies should not focus only on addressing barriers to employment for the 
job seekers of migrant background. Activation policies are highly relevant in the contexts where labour force 
participation of immigrants is lower than among the native-born. 
3 
1 Introduction 
This report presents the microsimulation model developed for multidimensional population projections. It 
contains a concise description of the model's specifications coupled with a detailed description of its labour 
force and employment module. The report also presents scenarios of economic integration of immigrants 1 from 
the third countries and a summary of their assumptions. Detailed parameters of each module can be found in 
the appropriate sections within the CEPAM-Mic software.  
The population projections are realized using a microsimulation model called CEPAM-Mic that allows the study 
of alternative scenarios and their consequences for future population trends in the European Union (at 
aggregate level as well as at the level of individual Member States). The model was built at IIASA within the 
scope of the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration (CEPAM) project, a partnership between the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA). This collaborative effort has been designed to assess the longer-term implications of migration and 
population related challenges. Population ageing and smaller labour force on the horizon are among the mo st 
acute demographic challenges EU will have to cope with in the coming decades. CEPAM -mic model allows 
analysing the implications of various immigration flows – in terms of their volume and composition – and their 
implications on population level indicators as well as on EU's labour force. EU-level results of scenarios that 
envisaged alternative migration situations in terms of size, educational composition and labour force activity 
of immigrants have been published in Lutz et al. (2019), section 3 "Impacts of migration on the EU labour force". 
The ad-hoc scenarios presented in this report have been developed in collaboration with DG HOME B1 unit on 
Legal migration and integration. This work extends the previous exercise by adding also the dimension of 
employment on top of labour force participation. The scenarios were designed in dialogue with DG HOME B1 
and reflect their specific policy needs. This technical report focuses rather on the documentation of the CEPAM-
mic labour-force and employment module and presents a few selected EU-level results from the five scenarios. 
                                        
1 We cons istently use the term immigrant for the third country nationals. 
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2 CEPAM-mic projection microsimulation model  
Microsimulation is an alternative approach to the deterministic macro-level population projection models that 
use aggregate level data to project future population dynamics. In microsimulation the modelling is based on 
individual level data. The baseline population consists of individual actors whose individual characteristics 
represent composition of a given population across chosen dimensions. The se individual actors are exposed to 
the risk of events relevant to their state – death, birth of a child (which generates a new actor inside the model), 
relocating to a different EU country, leaving to a non-EU country, achieving next level of education, entering or 
exiting the labour market and so on. Immigrants from non-EU countries  enter the model with a set of individual 
characteristics and are subjected to risk of the events mentioned above. This population is simulated in 
continuous time and the transitions between the states are determined stochastically.   
Microsimulation allows for including a larger set of dimensions than the standard multistate population 
projection models in which handling more than three-four dimensions becomes challenging. Handling multiple 
variables and states is more flexible in microsimulation.  
The microsimulation projection model used for this research allows the study of alternative scenarios of 
migration and their consequences for future population and labour supply tren ds in the European Union. It is 
developed in the Modgen language, which is a microsimulation programming language developed by Statistics 
Canada, integrated into the Microsoft Visual Studio C++ environment (Bélanger and Sabourin 2017).  The model 
is built following the framework proposed by Belanger et al. (Bélanger et al. 2019) to study population changes 
in a context of relatively high immigration and low fertility. CEPAM-Mic can thus dynamically project the 
population for EU28 member states under several socioeconomic and ethnocultural dimensions. Its base 
population counts 13 variables: 
 age2  
 sex 
 country of residence (28 EU Member States as of 2019) 
 student status (student, not student) 
 labour force participation (active, inactive)  
 employment (employed, unemployed) 
 age at immigration3 
 region of birth (11 broad regions4)  
 duration of residence (6 categories5)  
 education level (3 categories6)  
 education of the mother (3 categories7)  
 religion (4 categories8) 
 language (3 categories9) 
 
The use of microsimulation becomes necessary given the large number of categories in each of these 
dimensions or variables. Indeed, microsimulation is a powerful tool that can replace traditional multistate 
projections when the number of dimensions becomes large (Van Imhoff and Post 1998) and also allows for the 
use of complex statistical models to project life-course transitions and events. This microsimulation model is 
characterized by the stochastic simulation of individual life courses. Simultaneous sim ulation of individual life 
courses allows the model to dynamically update the risks of various events based on an individual’s state 
values, and further allows interactions between actors (see Table 1 for an overview). CEPAM -mic model utilizes 
the interaction to model intergenerational transmission of education by linking child's characteristics to those 
of the mother. Thus, one's educational attainment (for example a risk to achieve high education) does not 
                                        
2 The model runs  in continuous time; 5  year age groups  are used in the output. 
3 The variable generation s tatus i s derived from the age at immigration. The categories of this variable are the real age. Then 
we create 3-categories more general categories of the variable for the generation status: G1 – immigrants who arrived as 
adults, G1.5 – immigrants who arrived as children (by age 15), and G2 – descendants of immigrant parents. 
4 Except where the country of birth and res idence are the same: EU-15; NMS-13; Europe Outside EU-28; North Africa; Other 
A frica; Near M iddle East; East Asia; South South-East Asia; North A merica; A ustralia O ceania; Latin A merica  
5 Except where the country of birth and res idence are the same: 0  to 4  years ; 5  to 9  years ; 10  to 14  years ; 15  to 19  years; 20  
to 24  years; 25+ years 
6 Low (ISC ED 2 or lower), M iddle (ISCED 3), H igh (ISCED 4  or higher) 
7 Same as  above 
8 C hris tian; Muslim; No religion; O ther 
9 O ffic ial Language in C ountry of Res idence, O ther EU offic ial language, O ther languages 
5 
depend only on one's individual characteristics ( indicated in Table 1) but also on the educational attainment of 
one's mother. Some events, such as fertility for example, are determined by a larger set of status variables that 
are influential for the variation of fertility rates, others, such as mortality, by a smaller set of variables. Data 
availability for the statistical models and especially lack of comparable data for all EU28 countries sets limits 
to the interlinkages that can be captured and incorporated in the model.  
Table 1: Overview of the events modelled in CEPAM-mic and their determinating status variables 
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Methods to estimate parameters 
Fertility X  X X X X   X  Vital statistics, logit regression 
Mortality X X X      X  Vital statistics 
Domestic migration X X X        Population estimates, O/D matrices 
Emigration X X X        Population estimates 
Language used at home     X X X    Survival curves 
Religion X X X     X   O/D matrices 
Educational attainment X X X X   X X  X Ordered logit regression 
Labour force 
participation 
X X X X X X   X  Logit regression 
Employment X X X X X X   X  Logit regression 
Source: authors. 
 
Microsimulation methods are also very flexible in the sense that they allow the creation of scenarios10 combining 
different hypotheses concerning the future evolution of the stochastic parameters that drive the component of 
population changes (Van Imhoff and Post 1998; Spielauer 2010). 
A detailed description of the different modules that make up CEPAM-mic is available elsewhere (see Bélanger 
et al. 2019 for the framework; Marois, Sabourin, and Bélanger 2019a; 2019b for the education module and the 
labour force module; Potančoková and Marois (forthcoming) for the fertility module). In the next section we 
summarize in a nutshell the different components of the model, starting with the base population.  
 
2.1 The base population 
As mentioned previously, the baseline population is structured by 13 variables. However, there is no single data 
source (a survey or a census microdata files) that would contain all these variables and for all 28 EU member 
state.  Therefore, we could not create the base population stock from a single data source, but we had to 
triangulate several surveys and integrate the information from them.  
The main data source is European Labour Force Survey (LFS) as it includes all projected variables, except for 
religion and language spoken at home. For this reason and also the fact that its size is relatively large compare 
                                        
10 Scenario is in this case defined as  a combination of assumptions ac ross the projection components (variables). A ssumption 
spec ifies future value of a component or a parameter. 
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to other surveys, LFS is used as the main data source to build the base population and also to estimate several 
parameters of the microsimulation model. Although relatively large, the sample sizes of the LFS vary from 
country to country. Given the importance of analyzing the behavior of population groups which can sometimes 
be relatively small, it was useful to pool two years of the survey to increase accuracy and reduce the Monte 
Carlo error. Each record from these surveys is therefore an individual (an actor) in the microsimulation model 
(n=8,148,874). In addition, microdata from waves 1 to 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS) were used to 
impute the missing variables, religion and language spoken at home, in the base population. Imputation was 
done using polytomous logistic regressions in the MICE package in R (van Buuren and Groothuis -Oudshoorn 
2011).  
Compared to census data, LFS seems to measure some variables less well. In particular, the immigrant 
population of some countries seems to be significantly underestimated, which led us to calibrate the LFS data 
using European census data and other sources. The microdata set is thus calibrated in three steps: in the first 
step, the base population is reweighted to match the 2011 European census by country, age, sex, educational 
attainment, and place of birth (where available); in the second step, the base population is reweighted to match 
the religion distribution by country and sex (Hackett et al. 2015); the third and final step occurs during the 
projection where the population is calibrated on the 2015 EUROSTAT population counts by country of residence, 
age and sex11 that is further combined with Wittgenstein Center’s estimates on education composition of the 
corresponding population groups (WIC 2019). 
 
2.2 Mortality module and assumptions 
Mortality rates by age, sex and educational attainment are taken from Lutz et al. (2018). Future trends for 
these rates were set combining statistical models with experts judgement (Caselli et al. 2014). Continuous 
improvement in life expectancy at birth is assumed with long-term regional convergence, exceeding 90 years 
in most European countries by 2060. Differentials in life expectancy (at the age of  15) between the low and 
the high educated is, however, kept constant at about 4 years for females and 6 years for males. 
 
2.3 Fertility module and assumptions 
Using a simplified variant of the own-children method on pooled annual LFS data 2011-2015, differentials by 
age, country, education, student status (with an interaction with age), region of birth, age at immigration, and 
duration of stay were estimated using logit regression models (Potančoková and Marois 2018). Outcomes (see 
figure 1) show higher fertility for immigrants (generation 1 (G1)) from some regions such as Sub-Saharan 
countries, Middle East, and North Africa (MENA). The fertility is also higher for recent immigrants, but tends to 
converge towards the levels of native-born population with increasing duration of stay. For immigrants arrived 
during childhood (generation 1.5), fertility levels fall between that of their parents and of the natives.  
  
  
                                        
11 EUROSTAT table: demo_pjan 
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Figure 1: Odds ratios of giving birth by region of origin, generational status and duration of stay, native-born = reference 
category 
 
Note: Statistically significant results marked by asterisk 
Source: authors. 
 
The parameter for the student status reduces fertility for women that are still in full time education (OR=0.123). 
Parameters for the student status and the immigration variable are then contrasted to the weighted population 
average. These adjusted parameters are then added to the base age -, education-, and country-specific fertility 
rates from Lutz et al. (2018), which values were determined after a large expert survey in the field of fertility 
studies (Basten, Sobotka, and Zeman 2014). Experts assumed slightly increasing fertility for majority of EU 
countries due to the ongoing process of fertility postponement. These assumptions on overall fertility level in 
the EU countries in hand with the changing population composition by educational attainment (increasing share 
of post-secondary educated due to the assumed education expansion) and nativity status (see migration 
assumptions below) and at current differentials result in an increased total fertility rate from 1.64 in 2015-19 
to 1.78 in 2055-59 (see figure 2) for the whole EU28. 
 
Figure 2: Projected total fertility rates (TFR) for EU28 in the baseline scenario, 2015-2059 
 
Source: Potančoková and Marois 2019.  
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To allow greater flexibility in the development of migration assumptions, international immigration, which in 
the context of this research corresponds to that from non-European countries (i.e. the third countries), is treated 
separately from other migration movements, either international emigration to outside the EU or migration 
between EU countries (termed intra-EU mobility in this report12).  
Out-migration parameters were estimated in three steps. First, the intensity of out-migration is determined by 
computing country-level out-migration rates by sex and country of residence from the average number of out-
migrants between 2013 and 2016 (Eurostat table: migr_emi2) divided by the average population aged 20-3413 
during the same period. In a second step, age-specific out-migration rates are derived within the 
microsimulation model as follows: first, country-level out-migration rates are applied to the projected 
population aged 20-34 to get the expected number of out-migrants in a given period. The number of out-
migrants is then distributed according to age using a Rogers-Castro age schedule (Rogers and Castro 1981). 
Finally, the age-specific out-migration rates are obtained by taking the ratio of out-migrants to the population, 
by age, sex and country of residence. Out-migration rates in the simulation are recalculated every five years.  
During the simulation, out-migrants may either move within the EU, and are assigned a new country of 
residence, or they can leave the EU, in which case their simulation is terminated. The proportion of out-migrants 
leaving the EU is derived from Eurostat tables on emigration according to region of destination (table: 
migr_emi3nxt). Origin-destination matrix for intra-European mobility were derived using updated estimates for 
the period 2009-2016 of Raymer et al.’s (2013) Bayesian estimates of intra-EU mobility. Country-specific 
calibration factors are then calculated from a preliminary simulation for the period 2013-2016 in order to get 
the same number of entrances by country than what was estimated by Eurostat for the same peri od. These 
calibration factors are kept constant for the rest of the projection. 
International immigration is treated as a separate component and the model allows great flexibility on 
assumptions about the future flow of immigrants and their characteristics . Since the model does not project 
the rest of the world population, the size of future immigrant cohorts is an exogenous component and the 
annual number of immigrants by country is directly entered as a parameter. In this report, we refer to the 
baseline scenario with the following assumption of immigrants derived from the Eurostat data on the average 
number of international immigrants into the EU countries observed during the period 2013-2016. In order to 
correct the exceptionally high immigration inflows during the peak of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015-2016, 
we have adjusted the extreme values for Austria and Germany, and the flow of 2016 for Greece. The number 
of international immigrants arriving into EU in a 5 years period is thus assumed at nearly 10 million. This 
number of international immigrants is assumed to remain constant for all periods until the projection horizon 
in 2060. The immigrants are distributed into the EU Member states according to the respective shares in the 
2013-2016 Eurostat data and the resulting overall flows are presented in Table 2. 
 
  
                                        
12 The initial es timates pertain to moves  of EU  res idents between the EU  Member States. 
13 The age group 20 -34 was  chosen as  the exposure for the rate because majority of out -migrants are in that age at migration. 
Us ing whole population as  an exposure yields dis torted rate. 
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Table 2. Assumptions on the number of international immigrants (born outside EU28) (5 years inflow) 
Host country Baseline volume 
AT 223,597 
BE 263,245 
BG 84,909 
CY 31,609 
CZ 96,489 
DE 1,991,155 
DK 188,434 
EE 16,409 
ES 1,100,676 
FI 85,108 
FR 1,101,813 
GR 99,462 
HR 37,968 
HU 114,329 
IE 174,873 
IT 1,057,411 
LT 37,193 
LU 9,348 
LV 20,310 
MT 34,791 
NL 397,853 
PL 466,226 
PT 55,871 
RO 147,265 
SE 469,441 
SI 51,148 
SK 6,348 
UK 1,630,214 
EU28 9,993,490 
Source: authors. 
 
Characteristics of recent immigrants in the base population are used as a basis to determine the characteristics 
of future immigrants in the simulation. Through reweighting, it is possible to change the immigrant distribution 
10 
according to age, sex, education, place of birth, religion, and language in each country. This report presents only 
one assumption concerning the educational attainment of immigrants in the baseline scenario 14 , which 
supposes that future immigrants will have the same educational attainment as recent immigrants who arrived 
into the EU between 2001-2011  (estimated from the immigrants in the base population) (table 3). 
Table 3. Educational attainment of immigrants to the EU at age 25-44 in the baseline scenario 
Scenario Educational attainment 
Low Medium High 
Baseline 40% 27% 34% 
Source: authors. 
 
2.4 Language spoken at home and religious affiliation  
CEPAM-Mic also projects two ethno-cultural characteristics whose future evolution is highly dependent on 
immigration: religion and language spoken at home. At birth, religious affiliation and language spoken at home 
are taken directly from the mother, and are subsequently allowed to change during the life course. Adults can 
change their religious affiliation over the life course. Transition rates for religious affiliation15 are taken directly 
from the PEW projections on religion (Hackett et al. 2015). Life course transition rates for language spoken at 
home are based on model schedules (Sabourin and Bélanger 2015) calibrated using data from the European 
Social Survey. 
 
2.5 Educational attainment module and assumptions  
The education module of CEPAM-Mic is exhaustively described in (Marois, Sabourin, and Bélanger 2019a). In 
summary, CEPAM-Mic includes three levels of educational attainment16: 
(1) Low: Lower secondary or less (no education, ISCED 0, 1 and 2);  
(2) Medium: Upper secondary completed (ISCED 3; i.e. completed upper secondary);  
(3) High: Postsecondary (ISCED 4 and higher; i.e. post-secondary).  
The highest level of education that an individual will reach over the life course is set probabilistically at birth 
(or at arrival for immigrants who arrived during childhood) using parameters estimated from an ordered logit 
regression. The model explicitly considers the influence of personal characteristics and the highest educational 
attainment of the mother. Sex- and country-specific cohort parameters are also included and extrapolated to 
establish assumptions for future cohorts. The model equation is thus formulated as follows:  
Eq. 1    ln (
𝐸𝑖𝑗
1−𝐸𝑖𝑗
) = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝐶𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗 𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑗 (𝐶𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖 ) + 𝛽4𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑗 𝑍𝑖 
Where  
 𝐸𝑖𝑗  is the probability that an individual 𝑖 reaches level of education 𝑗, where 𝑗 equals High or Medium;  
 𝐶𝑡 is the country of residence;  
 𝐶𝑟 is a discrete variable for birth cohorts (1940-44=1; 1945-49=2, …, 1975-1979=8); 
 𝑋 is a set of sociocultural variables; 
 𝑍 is the highest educational attainment of the mother. 
                                        
14 Bes ides the baseline scenario (termed Central scenario in Lutz et al. (2019), several other scenarios which vary the assumptions 
on the volume and educational composition of the immigrants  from the third countries were developed for the CEPAM 
projec ted and presented in Lutz et al. (20 19). 
15 We cons ider the following four categories based on self-reported religious affiliation: C hristians, Muslims, Unaffiliated and Other 
religion 
16 The categories correspond to ISCED 2011 c lassification which was  implemented in LFS from 2014 onwards . Old er years use 
ISC ED 1997 c lassification. 
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Sociocultural variables include language spoken at home, religion, and region of birth. As such, the education 
module implements differentials in the educational pathways for children with an immigrant background as 
well as for different social classes as reflected by the education of the mother. The analysis of the parameters 
showed that the mother’s education is a strong predictor of children’s future educational attainment, while 
sociocultural variables, such as being Muslim (especially for women) or speaking a non -European language at 
home decrease the odds of getting postsecondary education. These findings are consistent with the existing 
studies on intergenerational transmission of educational achievements (Heath and Brinbaum 2007; Hirschman 
2001; Riphahn 2003; Shavit, Yaish, and Bar-haim 2007). 
In all scenarios of this paper, parameters β4 and β5 are kept constant throughout the projection, while country-
specific cohort trends (β0 to β3) are extrapolated over the time span of the projection. This in effect means that 
we assume continuation of the education expansion into the future. For postsecondary is capped at 90%, in 
accordance to other international projections of educational attainment (Wolfgang Lutz et al. 2018; Wolfgang 
Lutz, Butz, and KC 2014).  
Individuals are set as student starting from age 5 until the age of graduation from the highest completed level 
(but at most to age 29). The age at graduation is determined for all levels using Eurostat distributions by ISCED 
levels for the latest graduated cohorts (2013-2014). The modeling of education thus allows distinguishing,  for 
each individual at each projection step, a) the highest level of educational attainment that will be reached during 
the life course, b) the current level of education, and c) whether or not the individual is still in schooling.  
 
12 
3 Labour force participation and employment modules 
3.1 Labour force participation module  
The labour force participation module is described in detail in Marois et al. (2019b) and selected results at the 
EU level were presented also in Lutz et al. (2019, Chapter 3) and Marois et al. (2019c). The module is applied 
to individuals aged between 15 and 74. When a change occurs to the characteristic of an individual (age, 
education, duration of stay, etc.), the module determines probabilistically whether or not he/she participates in 
the labour force. The labour force participation status is imputed through a Monte -Carlo experiment in which a 
random number is compared to the probability of being active: a successful trial means that the simulated 
individual is active. Parameters are estimated from sex- and country-specific logit regressions on a binomial 
variable representing participation in the labour force, using pooled data from the 2010 to 2015 EU Labour 
Force Survey (LFS, annual files). Equation 2 below describes the modeling of labour force participation (P): 
Eq.2 logit(𝑃) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐷𝑈 + 𝛽3𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽4(𝐴𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑈) + 𝛽5(𝐴𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽6(𝐸𝐷𝑈 ∗
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽7(𝐴𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑈 ∗ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽9(𝐼𝑀15 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑈)  
 
Where: 
 β0 + β1+ β2+ β4 capture the joint effect of age and education on labour force participation rates17. 
Education is divided into 3 categories:  
1. Low (L): Lower secondary or less (no education, ISCED 0, 1 ,and 2); 
2. Medium (M): Upper secondary completed (ISCED 3);  
3. High (H): Post-secondary (ISCED 97: 4, 5A, 5B and 6; ISCED 2011: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8);  
 β3+ β5+ β6+ β7 capture the age and education specific trends in labour force participation; 
 β8 is a set of parameters for an immigration variable (IMMIG) combining place of birth 18, age at arrival 
and duration of stay. The variable is divided into five categories:  
1. Born in EU28; 
2. Born outside EU28, arrived before the age of 15; 
3. Born outside EU28, arrived after the age of 15, duration of stay < 5; 
4. Born outside EU28, arrived after the age of 15, 5 <= duration of stay < 10; 
5. Born outside EU28, arrived after the age of 15, 10 <= duration of stay;  
• β9 is a set of parameters estimating the labour force returns on education for migrants born outside 
the European Union and who arrived at the age of 15 or above (IM15). 
Using β0 to β7, we estimated probabilities of participating in the labour force by sex, education and country of 
residence (net from the immigration variable), and using the cohort development approach (Loichinger 2015), 
we computed entry and exit rates to build a labour force participation life table for a synthetic cohort. The life 
table is then used to derive future net future labour force participation rates by age, sex and educational 
attainment. These net labour force participation rates enter the model as assumptions). The estimated future 
net labor force participation rates show a notable increase in the participation rates of the population aged 50 
to 74, in particular for women. In this report, one assumption is used concerning future trends in participation 
rates: entry and exit rates estimated with the method described above are kept constant throughout the 
projection.  
In addition to the sex differential, regression models also account for another important source of in equalities 
with respect to the labour force participation, as they explicitly take into account differentials between EU28-
born and foreign-born as well as the integration process through parameters for the duration of stay (β8). It 
should be kept in mind that only legal immigration is considered.  
The figure 3 below shows the labour force participation rates derived from β8 and β9 (for the age group 35 -
39) for all EU countries. For men, labour force participation for immigrants born outside the EU is lower  at their 
arrival than for EU-born individuals (a gap of 6 percentage points for low educated, 8pp for medium and 7pp 
for high educated), but it improves with the number of years spent in the host country. After 10 years, the 
                                        
17 The LFS does  not provide information on labour force participation rates in the UK for the age group 70 -74. I t was  assumed to 
be half of the value observed for the age group 65 -69 for each education level. 
18 For Germany, the ques tion on the country of birth is  not asked in the LFS. We use the nationality as a proxy to distinguish EU28 
migrants  from international immigrants. 
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labour force participation rates of male immigrants are close to the rates of EU-born individuals (even slightly 
higher for low educated), and this holds true in most high immigration countries. 
Figure 3: Labour force participation rates derived from equation 2 by education levels, sex, and immigrant status, EU28, 
2010-2015 (age=35-39) 
 
Source: authors, based on analysis LFS data 2010-2015. 
 
For women, the gap compared to female EU-born is wider and is never completely closed. Among low educated 
recent immigrants, the participation rates is 23 percentage points lower compared to EU-born women (40% vs. 
63%). After 10 years, their participation rates, though improving, are still below the rates of EU-born (59%). For 
highly educated women born out of the EU the pattern is similar pattern but the gap to the EU-born women is 
wider after 10 years (81% vs 90%) compared to low-educated women (59% for non-EU-born compared to 
63% for EU-born). This is because the effect of education is smaller for immigrants, especially for women. 
These lower returns on education could be partly explained by lower quality degrees in source countries, as well 
as by cultural differences in the definition of gender roles (Inglehart and  Norris 2003; Antecol 2000). Reasons 
for immigration may play a role and one could expect higher labour force participation rates among immigrants 
coming as students or on economic grounds. In contrast, one can expect lower labour force participation rates, 
at least in the first years after immigration, among female immigrants arriving on family reunification grounds 
because in their case migration and family formation are directly interlinked. Studies on fertility outcomes of 
immigrants show elevated fertility rates in the first year after migration particularly for those arriving for family 
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reunification (Rosero-Bixby et al. 2011; Mussino and Strozza 2012). A decision to have a child shortly after the 
arrival into the host country can also be linked to poor employment prospects in the destination country (Kulu 
and Milewski 2007). 
Labour force participation rates of immigrant women do not reach the level of natives in any of the countries 
that host larger immigrant populations. Gender inequity in terms of labour force participation appears to be an 
issue affecting immigrant women more strongly than EU-born women, which supports the double disadvantage 
theory (Boyd 1984; Ballarino and Panichella 2017). These results are also consistent with evidences gathered 
in the U.S.by Antecol (2000) and in Europe by Pessin & Arpino (2018) concerning the role of cultural background 
in labour force integration: for some source regions, persistent gender gaps resist explanation based on socio-
economic or institutional factors alone.  
Large regional variations are, however, observed within the EU. In Denmark, where immigration inflows are 
dominated by asylum seekers and family reunification immigrants (Liebig 2007), the situation even appears to 
deteriorate with time for male immigrants, as β8 drops from -1.078 for recent immigrants to -1.692 admitted 
more than ten years ago. In contrast, Spain emerges as a special case, with no clear differences in LFPRs 
between male immigrants and native-born population / men. 
3.2 Employment module  
The employment module is a recent addition to CEPAM-Mic implemented on specific request by DG Home B1 
unit on Legal migration and integration. The module is conceived in the same manner as the labour force 
participation module and the parameters are only applied to the active population. Cohort effects are, however, 
not considered which implies that net rates by age stay constant. Constant scenarios allow evaluating long -
term effects of policy actions that would influence economic integration off immigra nts. Only individual 
characteristics of immigrants are considered and not the contextual factors or feedback effects. In real world 
these contextual factors, such as economic cycles etc., matter for unemployment rates and not only on 
individual characteristics and willingness to work. The data source is also the pooled data of the annual EU 
Labour Force Survey 2010 to 2015, and again only legal immigration is considered. The equation for the 
modeling is as follow: 
 
Eq.3 logit(𝐸) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝐷𝑈 + 𝛽3 (𝐴𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑈) + 𝛽4𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽5(𝐼𝑀15 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑈)  
 
Where: 
 β0 + β1+ β3 capture the joint effect of age and education on employment rates.  
 β4 is a set of parameters for an immigration variable (IMMIG) combining place of birth 19, age at 
arrival and duration of stay. The variable is divided in five categories:  
 β5 is a set of parameters estimating the employment returns on education for migrants born outside 
the European Union and who arrived at the age of 15 or above (IM15). 
The equation is applied separately to each sex- and country- specific combination, thus allowing to capture their 
specific dynamics. The figure 4 presents the unemployment rates derived from parameters of equation 3, which 
summarize the integration dynamic of immigrants for the whole EU28 by. 
  
                                        
19 For Germany, the ques tion on the country of birth is  not asked in the LFS. We use the natio nality as a proxy to distinguish EU28 
migrants  from international immigrants. 
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Figure 4: Unemployment rates derived from equation 3 by education level, sex, and immigrant status, EU28, 2010 -2015 
(age=35-39) 
 
Source: authors, based on analysis LFS data 2010-2015. 
 
Four main highlights stand out from Figure 4. First, unemployment rates of immigrants are much higher than 
those of EU-born, and, second, unlike in the case of labour force participation rates there is no evidence of 
improvement with the duration of stay.  After 10 years of stay, the unemployment rates of immigrants with 
medium or high level of education remain more than double the rate of EU-born. This is true for both genders 
and holds for all levels of education. Second, unemployment rates are particularly high for male immigrants 
who arrived during childhood and attained only low level of education. Their unemployment rate is about 7 
percentage points higher than natives’ ones with the same level of education (23% vs. 16%). The unemployment 
rates of female immigrants who arrived during childhood and for male immigrants arrived during childhood 
and attained medium or high level of education are also higher than those of EU-born but the gap is narrower. 
Third, the positive effect of education on employment rate holds for both EU-born immigrants from outside EU, 
but it is less pronounced for migrants than for EU-born. The unemployment rate for EU-born with a high level 
of education is about four times lower than the rate of their low-educated counterparts (for both men and 
women, but at different levels of unemployment). Among immigrants that live in EU since more than 10 years 
the gradient holds as well but the unemployment rate of highly educated is only about half of the low educated. 
In other words, high education brings less advantage in terms of higher employment to immigrants than for 
the native-born. Fourth, in general, women tend to have higher unemployment rates than men. This is true for 
all groups, including native-born population.  
The integration dynamic differs widely among countries. In terms of unemployment, the integration of 
immigrants in Sweden is particularly problematic for both men and women. After 10 years of stay, 
unemployment rates for highly educated immigrants are still about 3 times higher than of native -born. In 
Greece, differentials between immigrants and natives are much lower, not because immigrants are better 
integrated, but because unemployment of native-born are particularly high in the years under study. 
We built the assumptions on future employment using the parameters from the logit regression presented in 
equation 3. These assumptions are formulated with respect to future labour force participation and employment 
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rates as well as the differential in these rates between the immigrants vs. EU-born. Therefore, we specify four 
assumptions on baseline, high, low and gender equal future employment, as listed below:  
1. The baseline integration  assumes continuation of parameters β8 and β9 from equation 2 and β4 and 
β5 of equation 3 throughout the projection. In other words, this assumption supposes no change in the 
integration of immigrants in labour force and employment compared to what was observed in recent 
years. 
2. The high integration variant assumes that parameters for immigrants (β8 and β9 from equation 2 
and β4 and β5 from equation 3) converge to 0 for all countries by 2040. This assumption thus 
progressively removes the disadvantage of immigrants in the labour force and employment. By 2040, 
for a same country, age, gender, and level of education immigrants and natives would have the same 
labour force participation rates and the same unemployment rates. 
3. The low integration variant, in contrast, presents a hypothetical situation of a deterioration of the 
labour force participation and employment rates of immigrants.  β8 and β9 from equation 2 are assumed 
to converge by 2040 for all countries to those of Denmark in 2010-2015, which is the country in the 
EU where those parameters are the lowest (see parameters in table 4 and table 5). For employment, 
parameters β4 and β5 from equation 3 converge to those observed in Sweden, which is the high -
immigration country with the biggest gap between immigrants and natives. 
 
Table 4. Value of parameters β8 (eq.2) and β4 (eq.3) used as convergence point in 2040 for the low integration assumption  
  
  
 Value of β8 
(Denmark) 
 Value of β4  
(Sweden) 
Women Men Women Men 
Born in EU28 Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Born outside EU28, arrived before the 
age of 15; 
-0.272 -0.301 -0.589 -0.710 
Born outside EU28, arrived after the 
age of 15, duration of stay <5; 
-1.078 -1.638 -1.877 -1.706 
Born outside EU28, arrived after the 
age of 15, 5<=duration of stay <10; 
-1.421 -1.236 -1.595 -1.520 
Born outside EU28, arrived after the 
age of 15, 10<=duration of stay; 
-1.692 -1.422 -0.903 -1.016 
Table 5. Value of parameters β9 (eq.2) and β5 (eq.3) used as convergence point in 2040 for the low integration assumption 
   Value of β8 (Denmark)  Value of β4 (Sweden) 
Education level Women Men Women Men 
Low 0.681 0.865 Ref Ref 
Medium 0.314 0.235 -0.104 -0.101 
High Ref Ref -0.574 -0.336 
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3.3 Scenarios of labour force integration of immigrants  
Immigration policies and policy actions can be aimed at influencing, among other aspects, the following three 
dimensions of immigration into the EU: the volume of immigration, the socioeconomic composition of migrants, 
or the extent to the integration of newcomers. Up to date, international migration is managed by national 
governments and is not coordinated at the EU level20. Our stylized scenarios envision a set of what-if situations 
and focus on long-term effects of economic integration of immigrants in terms of their labour force 
participation and employment21. The results section of this report then evaluates the effectiveness of integration 
using these stylized ‘what if’ scenarios. All scenarios share the same assumptions (in terms of group -specific 
parameters) for fertility, mortality, intra-EU mobility22, educational attainment, language spoken at home and 
religious switching but vary in the combination of assumptions of labour force participation and employment 
of immigrants. Entry and exit labour force participation rates of EU-born population are fixed net of migration 
in order to show the effect of varied rates for immigrant population. We build four scenari os that combine 
assumptions on economic activity (labour force participation), or willingness to work, with actual employment 
rates. Table 6 summarizes the scenarios and their demographic and labour force assumptions. 
 
Table 6: Summary of scenarios and assumptions 
Component 
1-
Baseline 
2-High 
integration 
3-Low 
integration 
4-High 
employment 
Fertility 
Slight increase in the TFR from about 1.6 in 2015-19 to 1.78in 2055-
60 
Constant differential between the native-born and immigrants 
Mortality Continuous improvement in life expectancy 
Educational attainment 
Past trends continue, constant parameters for sociocultural 
characteristics 
Volume of immigration About 10 million from outside the EU every 5 years 
Educational composition of 
immigrants 
Same as recent immigrants (baseline) 
Labour force participation of 
migrants 
Baseline 
High integration 
variant 
Low integration 
variant 
Baseline 
Employment of international 
immigrants 
Baseline 
High integration 
variant 
Low integration 
High 
integration 
variant variant 
Labour force participation trends Constant exit and entry rates net from migration 
Intra-EU mobility Average rates of 2013-2016 
Language and religion shift Baseline rates 
 
1. The baseline scenario  presents a business as usual situation, an EU where labour force participation rates 
and employment rates of both EU-born and foreign-born population stay as they were in the recent past. 
2. High integration scenario envisages the best of the worlds – the highest labour force participation and 
employment rates of immigrants follow the best performing EU countries as described in the parameters 
section above. This most optimistic scenario can be seen as upper limit, the parameters are explained in the 
previous section. 
                                        
20 With an exception of asylum and the proposed Common European A sylum System (C EAS). 
21 We are aware that other dimens ion of economic integration, such as  wage inequalities, skills and so on can be cons idered but 
due to data availability we considering only the two mentioned dimensions. 
22 Intra-EU mobility continues as in the recent past, with the same in and out-migration rates between the countries. The resulting 
flows  change depending on the population s ize and age composition. In the model, immigrants and EU-born population have 
the same propens ity to move within the EU . 
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3. Low integration scenario  follows the worst possible situation and follows the worst labour force 
participation and employment rates among the EU countries and combines the two into a lower limit scenario. 
In this scenario, the economic integration of immigrants deteriorates in all EU countries. 
4. High employment scenario helps to understand purely the effect of high employment rates of immigrants. 
The activity (labour force participation) rates remain all EU Member states constant as of the  recent years until 
2060 but we model a situation of the highest observed employment rates of immigrant in all these countries.  
 
The four scenarios described above thus combine a set of three trajectories (variants 23) of labour force 
participation rates (baseline, high and low integration) with three variants of assumed trajectories of 
employment rates for foreign-born population (baseline, high and low integration) at fixed labour force 
participation rates and employment rates of EU-born population, and at fixed inflow of cca 10 million non-EU 
immigrants per each 5 year period. The immigrant flow has identical educational and age composition. This 
allows us to evaluate the impact of improved or worsened access to labour market and employment net of 
compositional changes of the immigrant flow. The most optimistic, high scenario combines high labour force 
participation with high employment of immigrants, in contrast to low integration scenario that combines low 
labour force participation with low employment,  and so on. 
 
                                        
23 Scenario and variant are not the same. Scenario is  a combination of assumptions on several dimensions of th e model. We have 
prepares  several sets of assumptions for some of the dimens ions –  in this  case labour force ac tivity and employment. These 
sets  are termed variants (high, low, baseline). 
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4 Results 
4.1 Labour force participation and unemployment rates of foreign and EU-born 
population  
We first compared the assumed trajectories of labour force participation and unemployment rates for EU-born 
and foreign-born population in the EU28 by 206024. The trajectories of labour force activity rates for EU 
population age 15-74 years are plotted in Figure 5. The presented overall rates are based on age -specific 
assumptions as explained in earlier sections and these trajectories differ for individu al Member States, 
depending on country-specific participation rates for native-born and foreign-born populations. Looking at EU 
average, the labour force participation rates (LFPR) of EU-born population follow in all scenarios the same 
trajectory and they increase from 64% in 2015 to 67% in 2060. Age-specific age patterns of labour force 
participation and sizes of older age groups versus younger ones explain the curve seen in Figure 5 (dotted line). 
The increasing proportion of the older population (65-74) among the working age population (15-74) drives the 
light decline of the overall LFPR towards 2035 because this age group has low labour force participation. The 
increase after 2035 is associated particularly with higher labour force participation of women  among the 55-
74 and the growth of the highly educated – among the younger but as well among the older age groups – 
because highly educated men and women have the highest labour force participation rates. 
For foreign-born, the high integration variant (used on High integration scenario) represents an increase from 
65% in 2015 (thus 1pp higher than the EU-born), peaking at 72% in 2040 followed by a gradual decrease to 
66% in 2060. In the baseline variant (used in Baseline and High employment scenarios) LFPR follows a similar 
trajectory as in the high variant but at a lower activity level: starting at 65% in 2050, peaking at 67% in 2040 
and declining to 61% in 2060. In the low integration variant (used in Low integration scenario) the labour force 
participation rates gradually decline to 53% in 2060. The initial increase in the first years is explained by the 
boost of young immigrants of prime working age to the existing stock in the EU. Because labour force 
participation increases with the duration of stay in the country, the inflow of new young immigrants drives the 
increase in the overall labour force participation rate of the immigrant population in the EU. The ageing of this 
immigrant stock is driving the declining overall labour force participation rate of  foreign-born and this becomes 
apparent after 2040.  
Figure 5: Labour-force participation rates of EU28 population age 15-74 in high, low and baseline variants, 2015-2060 
 
Source: authors. 
 
 
                                        
24 This  report presents the results for the EU . C ountry-specific results are available on request in a form of s truc tured dataset. 
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Figure 6 plots the trajectories of unemployment rates of working age population (15-74 years) , derived from 
three variants of assumptions on employment rates (described in earlier sections). Again, the figure presents 
EU average rate for working age population 15-74, but the assumptions are country specific. For EU-born 
population, the unemployment rate declines from 8.5% in 2015 to 7.1% in 2060. The foreign -born population 
in the EU has in 2015 almost double the unemployment rate (about 16%) than the EU-born (8.5%). In the high 
integration variant (used in High integration and High employment scenarios) we assume that the employment 
rates of foreign-born and EU-born converge in 2040. Therefore, in our high variant the unemployment rate of 
the foreign-born population drops to 7.5% in 2040 (EU-born level) and continues to decline to 7.1% in 2060. In 
the low integration variant (used in Low integration scenario) we assume worsening employment of immigrants 
and therefore the unemployment rate of foreign-born population exceeds 20% in 2040 and thereafter declines 
to slightly below this level in 2060. In the baseline variant (used in baseline scenario) the unemployment rates 
of foreign-born decline less rapidly as in high variant to 12.8% in 2060 (5.6pp higher than in high employment 
variant).  
 
Figure 6: Unemployment rates of EU28 population age 15-74 in high, low and baseline variants, 2015-2060 
 
Source: authors. 
 
4.2 How does economic integration of immigrants affect the overall employment 
rate?  
Economic integration is no doubt of great importance to life quality of immigrant families and communities as 
well as for social cohesion. It is also positively associated with better inclusion into the host society, faster 
acquisition of host-countries' language and with other aspects of social and cultural integration. Besides these 
positive aspects for the immigrant population, higher economic activity and employment of immigrants benefits 
host societies' economies. With our stylized scenarios of economic integration of immigrants, at fixed labour 
force participation rates and employment rates for the EU-born we can explore such effects for illustration of 
the impact of improved or worsened integration. To be able to evaluate such effect, we keep the size and 
composition of immigrant flows, as well as a number of demographic variables,  the same across all scenarios.  
The model accounts for structural changes in EU-born and foreign-born populations and is purely labour supply 
driven. We do not project changes in employment rates within a broader economic context and in relationship 
to possibly changing demand for labour that may arise due to changing nature of work, digitalization and 
automation. Here the focus is on the effect of various economic integration trajectories of immigrants from 
outside the EU on employment rate of total (economically active) population. 
We start with comparing the results for two scenarios that use the same baseline assumptions on labour force 
participation rate (LFPR): baseline, High employment. To sum up, the baseline scenario combines the baseline 
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economic participation rate with baseline employment for immigrants, High employment  scenario combines 
the baseline activity rate with high integration variant of employment rates (which reach the level of EU -born 
by 2040). Figure 7 depicts employment rates of foreign-born (age 15-74) in the EU in all four scenarios.  
Figure 7: Employment rates of foreign-born population (age 15-74) in the EU in four integration scenarios, 2015-2060 
 
Source: authors. 
Figure 8: Employment rates of total population (age 15-74) in the EU in four integration scenarios, 2015-2060 
 
Source: authors. 
 
In the baseline scenario the employment rate first increases from 58% to 58.8% in 2020, followed by a small 
decline to 58.3% in 2030 and then a more rapid increase to 59.9% 2060. High employment scenario shows a 
bit more steady increase to 60.7% in 2060 because immigrants gradually reach employment rate of their EU -
born counterparts The difference between the Baseline and High employment scenarios illustrates the effect 
of improved employment of immigrants to the level of the EU-born population. Closing of the gap between 
immigrants' and EU-born employment rates by 2040 thus increases the overall employment rate compared to 
the Baseline scenario by 1.17% (0.1pp) in 2040 and by 1.32% (0.8pp) in 2060.  
The very optimistic High integration scenario imagines that not only employment gap between the immigrants 
and EU-born closes by 2040, but that the gap in labour force participation closes as well. In other words, more 
immigrants would be willing to participate in the labour force and they will face no disadvantage in finding a 
job compared to their EU-born peers. In such case, the overall employment rate in the EU would be boosted by 
2.8% (1.6pp) in 2040, resp. 3.4% (2pp) in 2060, compared to the baseline scenario. 
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In a hypothetical situation that the labour market in the EU would not be able to absorb the same volume of 
immigrant as in the previous scenarios, the overall employment rates would remain below the 2015 level in 
the long-run. The very pessimistic Low integration scenarios assumes that the labour force participation of 
immigrants would decline to the lowest observed among the EU MS in 2015, and those in labour force would 
face increased barriers to employment (following the lowest observed employment rates among the EU MS in 
2015). In such case the overall EU employment rate would hit the bottom of 56.6% in 2040 and it would not 
recovered to 2015 level by 2060. 
 
4.3 Total labour force and employed population in the EU28 by 2060  
Because of the past demographic developments marked by low fertility and because of long-term momentum 
of these changes that are deeply ingrained in the age composition of EU's population, the size of EU's labour 
force is going to decline in the following decades afte r peaking sometime between 2015-2020. Our previous 
research has demonstrated that population ageing and decline in some of the Member States is unavoidable 
and smaller (but better educated) labour force a certainty unless immigration substantially increase s in future 
(Lutz et al 2019). Lutz et al 2019, however, did not present the results specifically for foreign -born population. 
In this section, we summarise the main future trends in labour force size and the size employed working age 
population separately for foreign-born and total population in the EU according to several stylized demographic 
scenarios until 2060. 
Under our projection assumptions, total labour force in the EU would peak at around 2020 at about 248 million. 
Under the baseline scenario, which assumes the volume and composition of immigrants into the EU mimicking 
the trends observed in the recent past, and if labour force participation rates of foreign -born do not improve in 
future and remain at 2015 levels - the total labour force in the EU would count about 226 million in 2060. It 
would be 20 million smaller compared to 2015, with a larger share of older workers. In contrast, the size of 
foreign-born labour force would gradually increase from about 22.5 million in 2015 (cca 9% of total EU la bour 
force) to nearly 49 million in 2060 in baseline scenario. This number can be about 4.5 million higher if labour 
force participation increased (High integration scenario, Figure 9). In case the labour force participation would 
deteriorate to the worst example seen in the EU recently, the foreign-born labour force size could be more than 
6 million smaller in 2060 compared to baseline scenario. Nothing else changed, this would reduce the overall 
EU labour force by the same amount and it would count little  less than 220 million in 2060. Lutz et al 2019 
(Chapter 3) further show that the labour force dependency ratio 25 would increase from 1.08 in 2018 to 1.33 in 
our baseline scenario by 2060. Better economic integration that would increase labour force partici pation rates 
of immigrants to the best observed in the EU in the recent past would result in only slightly lower ratio of 1.26 
dependents per 1 person in labour force. 
Figure 9: Total and foreign-born labour force size in the EU in 2015-2060, by projection scenario 
 
Source: authors. 
 
                                        
25 The ratio of economically inactive (i.e. dependants) to economically ac tive population. 
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Figure 10: Total and foreign-born employed population size in the EU in 2015-2060, by projection scenario 
 
Source: authors. 
 
The total numbers of the projected size of employed population (age 15-74) would be, naturally, smaller than 
the labour force, which also includes job seekers. The baseline scenario with fixed employment rates shows a 
decline from 222 million workers in the EU in 2015 to 206 million in 2015 (Figure 10). As a result of our 
migration assumptions, the total employed foreign-born population more than doubles in the baseline scenario 
from the estimated nearly 19 million workers in 2015 to 43 million in 2060 (Figure 10). The High employment 
scenario increases the projected number of workers by 2.7 million in 20 60 when we compare it to the baseline 
scenario. The most optimistic, High integration scenario (where the immigrants have the same activity and 
employment rates as native-born) tops up the baseline scenario estimate by 6.9 million workers. In contrast, 
worsening economic integration of immigrants shows smallest increase in the foreign-born employed 
population, at 34 million in 2060. 
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
Successful economic integration of immigrants is of high importance as it fosters also their socia l, linguistic 
and cultural inclusion and improves the quality of life of migrants, their families and empowers communities. 
Immigrants' better economic integration is highly needed also against the backdrop of the unavoidable future 
smaller labour force sizes in the EU overall and in practically all Member States. Integration policies and 
approaches vary greatly across the EU as they are grounded in the local context and because of great variety 
in the size and composition of resident foreign born-populations, volumes of recent immigrants and their 
diversity in terms of their reasons to migration, countries of origin, demographics, education and skills.  
EU overall, and majority of EU's Member States, can expect declining labour force size and increasing 
dependency ratios and this process will accelerate in the coming decades because of the past demographic 
trends. There will be more dependents (children, elderly, economically inactive of working age) per one 
economically active by 2060 than today. At the same time, a gap in labour force participation between the 
immigrants and EU-born exists in most EU member states. This gap is larger for female immigrants. For men, 
labour force participation rate reaches similar levels to natives after 10 years of stay, while it stays way lower 
for women.  Another important result of the LFS data analysis is that while the gap in labour force participation 
between EU-born and foreign-born closes with their longer presence in the country, this is not the case for the 
gap in employment. This means that immigrants face barriers to employment even after having resided in the 
host country for at least a decade. This is particularly true for low educated male immigrants. Our study does 
not further analyse the reasons for these gaps and their persistence, but we instead imagine different 
hypothetical trajectories of closing, persistence or widening of these gaps. 
The scenarios in this report ask what would be the long-term consequences on EU's labour force if the 
disadvantaged standing of immigrants persisted or what if it improved. We have explored through a set of 
styles scenarios – holding the demographic trends same for all of them – long-term effects of different 
trajectories of economic integration of immigrants from non-EU countries on EU's future labour force.  We have 
expanded our previous work on economic activity by including employment. These scenarios are not predictions 
but are crafted to demonstrate and evaluate the magnitude of the impact, focusing on long -term consequences 
of possible policy options. The baseline scenario is used as reference as it represents business as usual – trends 
continued. One can see the effect of improved economic integration (High employment, High integration and 
Gender equality for immigrants) or worsened economic integration when juxtaposed to the baseline scenario. 
The presented scenarios are conceived in a way that the low and high integration look at the most optimistic 
and the most pessimistic situation (based on 2010-2015 data) and can be seen as limits within which other 
possible trajectories fall within. 
We find that at the same immigration size and composition, the High integration scenario reduces the projected 
decline of the employed population by about 50% compared to the baseline scenario, while the low integration 
almost doubles the pace of the decline. The projected labour force sizes should be interpreted with caution 
because in order to demonstrate the effects of integration we fix labour force participation and employment 
for the EU-born, otherwise the interpretation of the results would be biased by other trends. This means that 
we are excluding any potential future improvements in labour force participation and employment among the 
EU-born, which is unlikely due to the already observed trend of increasing female labour force participation 
(especially among the younger cohorts) and also with respect to the projected educational expansion (highly 
educated are more active in the labour force). 
As previously emphasized, we focus on supply of labour driven by structural changes in potential labour force 
and we do not aim to simulate economic context, labour demand or changes in employment due to economic 
cycles. Also, there are no feedback effects included and labour force activity and employment depend purely 
on individual characteristics. We also assume no "discounting" of advantage of higher education during the 
projected continued educational expansion, meaning that highly educated immigrant will have the same chance 
to find employment in future although the overall EU labour force will be much better educated than today. 
Further, we do not look at skills only at education and, due to data existing data gaps, we do not differentiate 
between different migrant types. Extension in the direction of differentiating between different types of 
migrants based on their reasons for migration (economic vs family immigrants or asylum seekers) is conditional 
on better data availability. 
The analysis of LFS data showed great variety in labour force integration of immigrants across Member States. 
Our one-suits-all assumptions on convergence towards EU-born labour force participation, therefore, result in 
worsening integration trajectories in a number of countries where immigrants actually have hig her activity and 
employment rates (Czech Republic) or have higher activity rates but face high unemployment (such as in Greece 
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or in Italy). Another things to bear in mind is that the analysed LFS data pertain to 2010 -2015 and the gaps in 
labour market access some countries may have arisen due to specific situation during the past economic crisis, 
especially if the access to social protection and welfare differs for EU-born vs. immigrants. 
One important key message of this study is that integration policies  should not focus only on addressing barriers 
to employment for the job-seekers of migrant background. Activation policies are highly relevant in the contexts 
where labour force participation of immigrants is lower than among the native -born. Indeed, the High integration 
scenario shows much better outcomes than the High employment scenario at the EU level and for vast majority 
of MS. The latter is particularly important when thinking of better access to the labour market for women. 
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a partnership between the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission and the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education 
LFPR Labour force participation rate. The rate is dividing the number of people actively participating in the 
labor force by the total number of people eligible to participate in the labor force. 
LFS EU-Labour Force Survey 
MS  EU Member States (as of 2013-2019) 
Immigrants Persons born outside EU-28 and residing in EU's MS 
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